"Crossroads of Peace" as a new strategic concept for Armenia

After Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh last September, both countries expressed interest in reaching a peace agreement and border delimitation. Yerevan and Baku issued a joint statement pledging to release prisoners of war, while Armenia supported Azerbaijan in its bid to host the UN's COP29 international climate change conference this November.

Subsequently, Armenia unveiled its new "Crossroads of Peace" project, outlining Armenia's role in a post-conflict settlement that will connect the country infrastructurally with neighbouring countries, turning its territory into a transport crossroads along key international corridors.

Although Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev declared in March 2024 that the two countries are "closer to peace than ever before", Azerbaijan still has the upper hand in this situation and knows that it can still gain some territorial concessions, particularly with regard to the creation of the Zangezur corridor linking Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan, which borders Turkey. In this context, Azerbaijan has claimed that eight Azerbaijani villages were "still under Armenian occupation" and is demanding an amendment to the Armenian constitution, which states the unification of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. In further concessions, Yerevan handed over four villages to Azerbaijan. The Zangezur corridor was finally rejected by both sides in August this year, paving the way for a quicker peace deal.

Armenia has historically had good relations with Russia for a long time, and there is a bilateral treaty on the protection of Armenia, but it does not cover the territory of Karabakh. Therefore, Yerevan has long sided with Russia and has at least not criticised Russia in its foreign policy. Prior to the loss of control over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia refused to take a position in the UN General Assembly on all five resolutions concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, it abstained or was absent. It has even been accused of circumventing Western sanctions.

But after September 2023, Yerevan quickly set a course for geopolitical separation from Russia. The Armenian government was disillusioned by the absence of Russian support during the Armenian-Azerbaijani war in 2020 and 2023, even when Russia had its peacekeeping forces in place to oversee peace in the border region from 2020.

Yerevan therefore froze its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and joined the International Criminal Court, meaning also that Russian President Vladimir Putin would have to be arrested if he came to Armenia. With these steps, Moscow is losing its influence in the Caucasus, while it is fully concentrating on the war in Ukraine.

However, trade and people-to-people ties make it difficult to easily disengage from Russia. Russia is Armenia's largest trading partner. In 2022, exports to and imports from Russia accounted for 40 % and 22 % respectively. In 2022, a record $5.2 billion was sent to Armenia in personal remittances, while up to $3.6 billion came from Russia, accounting for around 5 % of Armenia's GDP. However, in 2024, this amount is gradually decreasing.

In addition, around 300 thousand Russians fled to Armenia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and there is still a Russian military base in Armenia. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Union, which prevents it from deepening trade relations with the EU within the framework of free trade agreements.

In this context, Yerevan has begun to seek greater support and cooperation from the West. An EU-led monitoring mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border has been set up, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has met with a number of senior Western officials in recent months, including Blinken, Macron, Scholz, senior EU officials and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. Armenia has even held military exercises with the US and a representative of the US military started to serve as an advisor to the Armenian Ministry of Defence. The US has declared its interest in promoting prosperity in Armenia, through which an international corridor to Europe will be routed. In addition, Azerbaijan criticized the April 2024 Armenia-EU-US trilateral meeting in Brussels.

Although senior European Union officials support the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, the European Union does not have a unified position on the conflict. While the European Union has condemned the outbreak of fighting, it has not imposed sanctions against Azerbaijan, particularly because of the important gas imports from Azerbaijan. However, the European Union has approved an aid package for the Armenian army of EUR 10 million, which makes Azerbaijan even more nervous.

Currently, Armenia is building the most important bilateral relations with France, India, Greece, Cyprus and Iran. This is related mainly to the arms purchases. This reflects the recent results of Armenian public opinion, which has dropped considerably concerning Russia.

French-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated sharply after 2023. Azerbaijan has criticised French arms supplies to Armenia and Paris has accused Baku of supporting independence movements in French New Caledonia during the recent violence. In addition, in July 2024 Azerbaijan hosted some 20 French separatist movements from Corsica, New Caledonia, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and other French overseas territories for a two-day congress in Baku.

Armenia's bilateral relations are deepening not only militarily but also in terms of investment. The French energy company Framatome is negotiating the construction of a new unit of Armenia's only nuclear power plant, while two years ago Yerevan signed a memorandum with Russia's Rosatom for the construction of this unit.

At present, Armenia's only friendly neighbour is Iran, which has expressed support for Armenia and opposed the creation of the Zangezur corridor, which would mean a territorial cut-off from Armenia, with a gas pipeline from Iran running through the territory. Tehran is also in confrontation with Baku over its growing ties with Israel, including the import of Israeli weapons.

Yerevan has very little room for manoeuvre, lacks strong alliances and security guarantees, while its location between Turkey and Azerbaijan complicates further development.

As Russia loses control of the South Caucasus, Armenia is seeking to forge a new partnership with the West to build new security guarantees.

It is questionable to what extent Yerevan will succeed in moving away from Russia's influence. Although there are potential limits to this diversion in the form of another war with Azerbaijan, the presence of a Russian military base and trade relations with Russia, the rapid pace of Yerevan's real policy of moving westwards, with the idea of even integrating into the European Union, can be monitored in recent months.

However, the recent visit of Russian President Putin to Baku underlined the importance of relations between Moscow and Baku. The fact that the Russian President expressed interest in mediating the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan testifies to the gradual loss of influence in the region, since in the past Russia directly took this initiative.

It is the 'Crossroads of Peace' project that is supposed to represent a new strategic concept for the Armenian state, which would complete the country's infrastructure, link it to neighbouring countries, normalise relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and make Armenia less expendable to foreign powers. This would give Armenia an opportunity to create new alliances and thus certain guarantees of security. World powers such as the United States, Japan and the EU have declared their interest in creating a corridor from Central Asia to Europe, with individual commodities not transiting through Russia or China.

If implemented, the 'Crossroads of Peace' project could boost regional trade, attract investment in infrastructure and logistics, while expanding trade corridors and creating easier and faster links to European markets.